The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. Federalist Papers Summary. The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them. We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. Don't get democracies and republics confused. Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities? Law class. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms. How does he answer it? stacysalter TEACHER. The opportunities which some States would have of rendering others tributary to them by commercial regulations would be impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become disunited. No motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic establishment. The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. 5 terms. A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History. Relevance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. Browse. Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would? To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. "Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the others are able to quell it. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. A strong united nation can only invite allies & suppress war, while a divided nation will do the opposite. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent appendages of military establishments. It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer. There is no set age for retirement, and the only way they are removed is if they are impeached or step down. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising from domestic causes. Lists and discusses different classes miscellaneous powers. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius II. Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free people. How liable would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves. A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve and perpetuate it. This was certainly the most, delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. The nation is a sick patient and needs a immediate treatment (constitution) but those opposing may lead to its death. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. The executive has control over military and navy (commander-in-chief), and has the power to pardon. Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the apportionment made.